See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §1701z–2(a) (providing that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development “shall require, to the greatest extent feasible, the employment of new and improved technologies, methods, and materials in housing construction[ ] under [HUD] programs”); 47 U. S. C. §903(d)(1) (providing that “the Secretary of Commerce shall promote efficient and cost-effective use of the spectrum to the maximum extent feasible” in “assigning frequencies for mobile radio services”). Quoting statements from both the House and the Senate about the sex offenders then “lost” to the system, Reynolds explained that the Act’s “supporters placed considerable importance upon the registration of pre-Act offenders.” Ibid. To the framers, each of these vested powers had a distinct content. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. §20913(d). . P. 1. Consider, too, this Court’s cases addressing vagueness. 40  7 Cranch 382, 388 (1813) (emphasis added). Before SORNA’s enactment, Herman Gundy pleaded guilty in 2005 to a sexual offense. 8894. In Reynolds, the Court considered whether SORNA’s registration requirements applied of their own force to pre-Act offenders or instead applied only once the Attorney General said they did. See also B. Iancu, Legislative Delegation: The Erosion of Normative Limits in Modern Constitutionalism 87 (2012). If that argument won’t work, the plurality points us to §20913(d)’s second clause, which grants the Attorney General the authority “to prescribe rules for the registration of . Wayman itself might be explained by the same principle as applied to the judiciary: Even in the absence of any statute, courts have the power under Article III “to regulate their practice.”44, Before the 1930s, federal statutes granting authority to. 51  Id., at 426 (quoting Wayman, 10 Wheat., at 43); 293 U. S., at 429. 74  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108–109 (1972); see Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 358, n. 7 (1983); Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7–9). The dissent found the majority’s excursion into history “quite superfluous” given that the “text of the Act itself makes clear that Congress sought” to ensure the registration of all pre-Act offenders.

inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration.”95 While those adopting SORNA might have declared that they hoped and wished for a “comprehensive national system,” the fact remains that the law they actually adopted for pre-Act offenders leaves everything to the Attorney General.

575, 583 (1972) (“[T]he delegation doctrine retains an important potential as a check on the exercise of unbounded, standardless discretion by administrative agencies”); Michigan Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F. 3d 23, 34 (CADC 2008) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“[The majority] conjures standards and limits from thin air to construct a supposed intelligible principle”) (collecting cases); Schoenbrod, 83 Mich. L. Anticipating that explanation, Gundy falls back on the claim that the Court’s account of Congress’s motivations “cannot supply the intelligible principle Congress failed to enact into law.” Id., at 12 (citing Whitman, 531 U. S., at 473). Id., at 444–445. Such an individual must register—provide his name, address, and certain other information—in every State where he resides, works, or studies. You’ll be in good company: Quimbee is one of the most widely used and trusted sites for law students, serving more than 97,000 law students since 2011. become all but a vestigial euphemism”); P. Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? Eldon Van Gundy (plaintiff) created an irrevocable trust, designating himself as the beneficiary and his son, Quinton Van Gundy (defendant), trustee. In turn, the executive might point to Congress as the source of the problem. . 22  The Federalist No. Congress gave the Attorney General authority to “specify the applicability” of SORNA’s requirements to pre-Act offenders. Article I of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” §1. There’s a good argument, as well, that the statute in J. W. Hampton passed muster under the traditional tests. 15338 (2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“The penalties in this bill should be adequate to ensure that [the 100,000 missing offenders] register”); id., at 13050 (statement of Sen. Frist) (“Every day that we don’t have this national sex offender registry, these missing sex  predators are out there somewhere”). 73  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159–160 (2000).

The Attorney General may choose which pre-Act offenders to subject to the Act.

Here's why 412,000 law students have relied on our case briefs: Are you a current student of ? 47  See A. Shlaes, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression 214–225 (2007). From 2008–2009, the value of trust assets plummeted, and Eldon instructed Quinton to liquidate. We read the statute as adopting the latter approach.

23  Id., No. Davis v. Michigan Dept. 38046 (2008); 76 Fed. Art. We’re not just a study aid for law students; we’re the study aid for law students. And indeed, the dissent emphasized that common ground, remarking that “the Court acknowledges” and “rightly believes” that registration of pre-Act offenders was “what the statute sought to achieve.” Id., at 448–449.1. 48, at 309–312 (J. Madison). The Attorney General’s own edicts acknowledge the consider- able policy-making powers he enjoys, describing his rules governing pre-Act offenders as “ ‘of fundamental importance to the initial operation of SORNA, and to its practical scope .